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Abstract: The Italian contribution to the Socialist Economic Calculation Debate 
(SECD) cannot be limited to the important and fundamental works by Pareto and 
Barone. In fact, if their contributions are still ambiguous and we have to wait for 
the Mises’ paper in 1920 in order to get the needed clarifications, during the 
1960s Bruno Leoni follows the Austrian footsteps on the topic, stimulating in 
Italy a great debate. Bruno Leoni’s role is important because of the debate he 
promotes and the scholars he involves, but also because he places the matter of 
the socialist economic calculation in the broader context of the rule of law. 
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I 
THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CALCULATION DEBATE (SECD): AN 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Socialist Economic Calculation Debate (SECD) involved in the first part of 
the 20th century a great number of important economists. The purpose of the 
present paper is not to summarize the debate, since this work is already done 
and the scholars which are looking for the best summaries have to start with 
Huerta de Soto (2010, chapters 4, 5 and 6)1 and White (2012, chapter 2) 
Mises and Hayek faced, in particular during the 1920s and 30s, many socialist 
economists on one central point: is it possible to have a rational economic 
calculation under a socialist society? Actually, the question has to be considered 
much more deep than a simple economic problem. In fact, in answering to the 
question a perspective on human society arises. The point is: can the plan from a 
single man or institution (the central planner) replace the free action of the 
persons in a complex society? 
Following Huerta de Soto (2010), we can think to the society (and market is 
one peculiar institution inside the society) as the place where the individuals 
meet each other, with their expectations and plans. In trying to accomplish their 
plans, all persons are entrepreneurs.  
According to the Austrian vision, a dynamic equilibrium, in which human 
actions try to coordinate in order to accomplish the plans, is possible to be 
reached only if actions are free. This doesn’t mean that all the plans will be 
reached and we can obtain a static and perfect equilibrium like in the neoclassical 
theory. But, in a free society the people are free to learn from their mistakes, so 
they are free to amend their plans and expectations, according to what they learn 
from the mistakes and from the interaction with other people. 
According to the socialist view, instead, it is possible for a central planner to 
collect all data in order to produce a perfect economic calculation. In this way, it 
is the central authority that supplies the information to the actors in terms of 
prices, goods to be produced, quantities, etc… These idea became so common 
during the 1920s and 30s, that a certain degree of central planning was widely 
accepted outside from the Marxist environment. Keynes is the most important 
example, while the neoclassical theory is the “liberal” and mathematical version 
of this intellectual mistake. 
 
For more than half a century, the belief that deliberate regulation of all social affairs 
must necessarily be more successful than the apparent haphazard interplay of independent 
individuals has continuously gained ground until to-day there is hardly a political group 
                                                 
1 The bibliography on the debate is really huge. Here we’d like to suggest to read Lavoie (1981), 
Rothbard (1991) and Boettke (2001). 
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anywhere in the world which does not want central direction of most human activities in 
the service of one aim or another. (Hayek, 1935a, p. 1). 
 
The fundamental objection coming from the Austrian side is that a central 
plan can work only in a static society, in which all data are known and the 
content of information never changes between the starting and the ending 
moments of the economic process. This, of course, is not the real world. The first 
mistake is that data cannot be known, as already recognized by Pareto2. Actually, 
data doesn’t exist in the beginning of economic process. They start to be 
generated by the actors, when they decide to do something. These actions (i.e., to 
think what should I produce in order to get a profit) take place in space and in 
time, crossing each other. It is the price-mechanism that permits that 
coordination between the actions and the plans3, so they can be redirected 
according to the modified content of information: discovering mistakes, 
acquiring new information, new actors… 
 With no price-mechanism and with no money4, no economic calculation is 
conceivable. Economists (neoclassical, socialists, Marxists) never recognized the 
nature of the challenge by Mises and Hayek. They always debated on a static 
level. But, as Huerta de Soto (2010, p. 8) explains, Mises always said that 
economic calculation, from a static perspective, poses no problem in a socialist 
commonwealth. The problem arises when we shift to the real world, when the 
basic fact is the coordination between unpredictable actions in the space and 
time, according to expectations that can continuously change. The nature of the 
problem, thus, is totally dynamic. 
 The other classical objection against the Austrians is that the problem can be 
solved with accurate mathematical methods and with computers. This is not 
true, because the problem is not practical, it is theoretical. The essence of the 
matter is that information is not known and is continuously generated during the 
action process and it changes in time according to the new information.  
 Finally, also every “competitive solution”, as a mix between free market and 
economic plan, cannot work, because it doesn’t solve the fundamental problem: 
the source and changeable nature of the information in time and space5. 
 What we will analyze in the paper is the contribution of an Italian scholar, 
Bruno Leoni, to the debate. As we will see, his contribution is important because 
it takes place in a country, Italy, and in a period, the 1960s, in which the 
environment, political and economic, is completely against the free market. The 
voice of Bruno Leoni is, in that context, almost the only one following the 
Austrian School of Economics. 
 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Hayek (1975a). 
3 Hayek (1935a), pp. 7-8. 
4 Hayek (1935b), p. 206. 
5 Hayek (1940). 
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II 
SOME ITALIAN PRECURSORS OF BRUNO LEONI: PARETO AND BARONE  
 
As we saw, the peak on the socialist economic calculation debate (SECD) is 
reached in the inter-wars period, when in general the economic debate lives a 
moment of glory that probably will be experienced no more in the future6. The 
other important topic developed in these years regards business cycle theory; 
also in this field the Austrian economists contribution, in particular Mises and 
Hayek, is recognized as fundamental. In general, the German speaking scientific 
environment is the more dynamic one, while the English world will emerge only 
in a second moment, after the Keynes’ General Theory (1936). 
Regarding the SECD7, although the peak of the debate is developed around 
Mises (1935) and Hayek (1935c), important contributions come from other parts 
of the world. Okon (1997, 2009, 2011) tells us as that the Yamamoto’s thought is 
crucial for the debate in Japan, but something interesting comes also from Italy, 
in a peculiar way. It has to be noted that we have two important Italian authors 
which bring out an analysis on the topic before Mises (1935). They are Pareto 
(1902, 1996) and Barone (1935). Actually, the 1890-1914 period can be considered 
very bright for the Italian economic analysis8, as stated by Schumpeter (2006, p. 
822), referring in particular to Pareto: 
 
The most benevolent observer could not have paid any compliments to Italian 
economics in the early 1870’s; the most malevolent observer could not have denied that it 
was second to none by 1914. The most conspicuous component in this truly astounding 
achievement was no doubt the work of Pareto and his school […] even independently of 
Pareto, Italian economics attained a high level in a variety of lines and in all applied fields. 
 
In writing this Schumpeter has in mind Vilfredo Pareto, Maffeo Pantaleoni, 
Enrico Barone and Antonio De Viti de Marco, all of them born between 1848 and 
18589. Schumpeter (2006, p. 825), adds that Barone «blocked out the theory of a 
socialist economy in a manner on which the work of our own time has not 
substantially improved». The Austrian economist devotes a lot of attention to 
Pareto, and also deeply describes the Barone’s 1908 article10, but concluding, with 
his traditional emphasis, that 
 
[t]hree leaders, von Wieser, Pareto, and Barone, who were completely out of sympathy 
with socialism, created what is to all intents and purposes the pure theory of the socialist 
                                                 
6 See Shackle (1983). 
7 For a general account on the SECD, see Huerta de Soto (2010). 
8 We can only mention here the fundamental role played by Maffeo Pantaleoni in the further 
development by Pareto and Barone. On Pantaleoni see Bellanca and Giocoli (1998). 
9 Faucci (1990), p. 187. 
10 Schumpeter (2006), pp. 952-955. 
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economy, and thus rendered a service to socialist doctrine that socialists themselves had 
never been able to render. (Schumpeter, 2006, p. 952). 
 
Here we cannot deep the analysis of Pareto’s and Barone’s thought. We will 
talk about that analyzing Leoni (1965b, 1965c). Barone’s paper, actually, caught a 
lot of attention and admiration, and we have to think that even Hayek wanted to 
publish it in his Hayek (1935c). But both Pareto and Barone weren’t able to deep 
the matter as Mises (1935) did. In particular, they failed to clearly assert and 
specify that the problem involved in the economic calculation is not a 
mathematical one, but a problem related with the possibility to obtain 
information, eventually needed to the mathematical problem11. 
 
Next we should mention the contribution of Vilfredo Pareto. We have an ambivalent 
assessment to make of Pareto’s influence on the subsequent debate over socialist economic 
calculation. His influence was negative to the extent that he focused on the mathematical 
analysis of economic equilibrium, an approach which always presumes from the beginning 
that all information necessary to achieve equilibrium is available. This approach gave rise 
to the idea, which Enrico Barone later developed and many other economists repeated ad 
nauseam, that the problem of economic calculation in socialist economies could be 
mathematically resolved in the very same way it had been raised and resolved by 
mathematical equilibrium economists in the case of a market economy. Nonetheless, 
neither Pareto nor Barone is totally responsible for the incorrect interpretation just 
mentioned, since both explicitly drew attention to the impossibility of solving the 
corresponding system of equations without the information the market itself provides. 
Specifically, in 1897, Pareto went so far as to assert, in reference to solving the system of 
equations which describes equilibrium: “As a practical matter, that is beyond the power of 
algebraic analysis … In that case the roles would be changed; and it would no longer be 
mathematics which would come to the aid of political economy, but political economy 
which would come to the aid of mathematics. In other words, if all these equations were 
actually known, the only means of solving them would be to observe the actual solution 
which the market gives”. Pareto expressly denies the possibility of accessing the 
information necessary even to formulate the system of equations which would make it 
possible to describe equilibrium, and he simultaneously touches on a secondary problem: 
the algebraic impossibility of solving, in practice, the system of equations which formally 
describes equilibrium. (Huerta de Soto, 2010, pp. 100-101). 
 
Actually, both Pareto and Barone specified that the problem is not a 
mathematical one. In Pareto (1996, pp. 233-234) we can read: 
 
Les conditions que nous avons énumérées pour l’équilibre économique nous donnent 
une notion générale de cet équilibre. Pour savoir ce qu’étaient certains phénomènes nous 
avons dû étudier leur manifestation; pour savoir ce que c’était que l’équilibre économique, 
                                                 
11 «Economic choice does not consist in comparing the items in a list, known to be complete, of 
given fully specified rival and certainly attainable results. It consists in first creating, by 
conjecture and reasoned imagination on the basis of mere suggestion offered by visible or 
recorded circumstance, the things on which hope can be fixed. These things, at the time when 
they are available for choice, are thoughts and even figments»; Schackle (1972), p. 96, quoted in 
Lachmann (1994b), p. 240. 
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nous avons dû rechercher comment il était déterminé. Remarquons, d’ailleurs, que cette 
détermination n’a nullement pour but d’arriver à un calcul numérique des prix. Faisons 
l’hypothèse la plus favorable à un tel calcul; supposons que nous ayons triomphé de toutes 
les difficultés pour arriver à connaître les données du problème, et que nous connaissions 
les ophélimités de toutes les marchandises pour chaque individu, toutes les circonstances 
de la production des marchandises, etc. C’est là déjà une hypothèse absurde, et pourtant 
elle ne nous donne pas encore la possibilité pratique de résoudre ce problème. Nous avons 
vu que dans le cas de 100 individus et de 700 marchandises il y aurait 70.699 conditions (en 
réalité un grand nombre de circonstances, que nous avons jusqu’ici négligées, 
augmenteraient encore ce nombre); nous aurons donc à résoudre un système de 70.699 
équations. Cela dépasse pratiquement la puissance de l’analyse algébrique, et cela la 
dépasserait encore davantage si l’on prenait en considération le nombre fabuleux 
d’équations que donnerait une population de quarante millions d’individus, et quelques 
milliers de marchandises. Dans ces cas les ròles seraient changés: et ce ne seraient plus les 
mathématiques que viendraient en aide à l’économie politique, mais l’économie politique 
que viendrait en aide aux mathématiques. En d’autres termes si on pouvait vraiment 
connaître toutes ces équations, le seul moyen accessible aux forces humaines pour les 
résoudre, ce serait d’observer la solution pratique que donne le marché. 
 
Huerta de Soto (2010, p. 101) explains how the Barone’s perspective is very 
similar to the Pareto’s one. 
 
Following Pareto, Enrico Barone, in his well-known 1908 article devoted to the 
application of the paradigm Pareto initiated to the collectivist state, explicitly asserts that 
even if the practical difficulty of algebraically resolving the above system of equations 
could be overcome (which is not theoretically impossible), it would in any case be 
inconceivable (and therefore would be theoretically impossible) to obtain the information 
necessary to determine the technical coefficients required to formulate the corresponding 
system of equations. 
 
In fact, Barone (1935, pp. 287-288) states that it 
 
is not impossible to solve on paper the equations of the equilibrium. It will be a 
tremendous – a gigantic – work: but it is not an impossibility […] But it is frankly 
inconceivable that the economic determination of the technical coefficients can be made a 
priori […] This economic variability of the technical coefficients is certainly neglected by 
the collectivists […] It is on this account that the equations of the equilibrium with the 
maximum collective welfare are not soluble a priori, on paper. 
 
These words drove Schumpeter to believe that Barone clearly solved the 
problem of the economic calculation in a socialist society12. But even Schumpeter 
was misguided13, and following Huerta de Soto we have to conclude that the 
                                                 
12 This point is well developed in Lavoie (1981). 
13 Huerta de Soto (2010), p. 125. Schumpeter (2003, pp. 172-173), states: «given a socialist system 
of the kind envisaged, is it possible to derive, from its data and from the rules of rational 
behavior, uniquely determined decisions as to what and how to produce or, to put the same 
thing into the slogan of exact economics, do those data and rules, under the circumstances of a 
socialist economy, yield equations which are independent, compatible—i.e., free from 
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Pareto’s and Barone’s statements are not so clear to consider them as solvers of 
the problem14. 
 
Despite these clear (though isolated) warnings, we stated earlier that our assessment of 
Pareto’s and Barone’s contributions is ambivalent. In fact, though both authors explicitly 
refer to the practical obstacles to solving the corresponding system of equations, and they 
also mention the insurmountable theoretical impossibility of obtaining the information 
necessary to describe equilibrium, by initiating a new scientific paradigm in economics, 
one based on the use of the mathematical method to describe the equilibrium model at 
least in formal terms, they are inexorably forced to assume that, at least in these formal 
terms, the necessary information is available. Hence, regardless of the reservations Pareto 
and Barone voiced in passing, a very large number of the economists who have continued 
the paradigm they initiated still fail to understand that the mathematical analysis of 
equilibrium has, at most, a hermeneutical or interpretive value which adds not one iota to 
the possibility of theoretically solving the problem faced by all governing bodies which 
aim to acquire the practical information necessary to coercively plan and coordinate 
society. (Huerta de Soto, 2010, pp. 100-101). 
 
 Until Mises (1935) we have to consider the debate and the problem still not 
properly approached. We wish to remark here only that the Italian contribution 
to the SECD is but of secondary importance. In general, the Italian economics 
preserves a very high degree of development until the Second World War. If in 
the Thirties Hayek discovers Barone, this one is not the only Italian economist to 
be appreciated abroad, in particular in the German environment. The Italians are 
very active in promoting and developing a monetary theory and a business cycle 
analysis that’s very close to the ones that in the same time are arising from 
Austria and Germany through the pens of Hayek and Arthur Spiethoff15. We 
have to mention in particular Costantino Bresciani-Turroni16, Gustavo del 
Vecchio17, Marco Fanno18 and the original contribution (but still German-
oriented) by Guido Menegazzi19. 
The Keynesian revolution will change the situation in Italy too and the 
context in which Bruno Leoni will bring out his contribution is completely 
different. The common ground between Italians and German speaking 
                                                                                                                                                 
contradiction—and sufficient in number to determine uniquely the unknowns of the problem 
before the central board or ministry of production? 
1. The answer is in the affirmative. There is nothing wrong with the pure logic of socialism.  […] 
The only authority standing for denial that we need to mention is Professor L.von Mises. […] 
The economist who settled the question in a manner that left little to do except elaboration and 
the clearing up of points of secondary importance, was Enrico Barone». 
14 On the differences between Mises and Barone see also Rothbard (1991). 
15 On the connection between Hayek’s and Spiethoff’s approach on business cycle see Ferlito 
(2010a). On the Spiethoff’s business cycle theory see Ferlito (2010b). On the links between the 
Italian analysis and the Austrian Business Cycle theory see Ferlito (2012), paragraph 3. 
16 See Hagemann and Rösch (2001), pp. 193-195; Pavanelli (2000), p. 531); Realfonzo (2000), p. 534. 
17 Realfonzo (2000), pp. 545 and 554. 
18 See Nardi Spiller (2010) and Nardi and Pomini (2007). 
19 See Ferlito (2011b). 
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environments disappears and the new leading economists belong to a different 
school, no more free-market oriented, but more close to the Keynesian “gospel” 
and the socialistic utopia. In Italy the new revolution takes place combined with 
the neo-ricardian approach by Piero Sraffa. It is what we will see in the next 
section. 
 
 
III 
ITALIAN ECONOMICS IN THE 1960S: HINTS 
 
Leoni’s work on the topic arises in a hostile environment. Bruno Leoni writes 
and promotes a general debate on the SECD in the beginning of the Sixties; these 
are years in which in Italy the economic freedom thought is suffering and in the 
politics the liberal influence of Luigi Einaudi is finished. In 1962 the first centre-
left coalition (Christian-democrats and social-democrats) takes the power 
(Amintore Fanfani, the famous economic historian, is Prime Minister); it is the 
year in which the government promotes the nationalization of electrical supply. 
The Sixties are very famous in Italy because of the increasing role of unions, 
proclaiming long strikes and creating a lot of inflationary troubles. 
The economic theoretical situation, instead, is lead by two Sraffian 
economists, Luigi Pasinetti and Paolo Sylos Labini20. Indeed, it is in 1960 that, 
finally, Piero Sraffa publishes Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities21. 
But this work has to be considered only as the arrival point in the Sraffian 
reflection, started in the Twenties. Communist and friend with Antonio Gramsci, 
Piero Sraffa22 meets Keynes in London in the early Twenties, thanks to Gaetano 
Salvemini and Mary Berenson. In 1927 he moves to Cambridge, thanks to 
Keynes, which makes it possible for the young economist to publish important 
papers and to start the collection of the Ricardo’s work; we have to recall in 
particular the Sraffa-Hayek23 debate on money and capital, following the Hayek-
Keynes debate on the same topic. 
As stated by Gustavo del Vecchio, Sraffian economics is like coming back to 
Ricardo24. Lachmann (1973, 1994a) speaks about neoricardian revolution. With 
his analysis, however, he becomes an example for the young generation of 
economists that’s growing up in Italy, in particular because of the criticism 
against the Italian tradition, against Pantaleoni and Barone. In particular, Sraffa 
                                                 
20 Of course, the scenario is more complex and we have to mention the relevance of Giuseppe di 
Nardi and Federico Caffè, the great leader of Political Economy School, suddenly and 
misteriously disappeared the day after his retirement. But the scope of the present paper forces 
us to limit our hints to Pasinetti and Paolo Sylos Labini, because of their Sraffian approach.  
21 See Sraffa (1960). The book is published in Italian and English in the same year. 
22 For a biographical sketch on Sraffa, see Ruffolo (2005), pp. 257-288. 
23 See Sraffa (1932a, 1932b) and Hayek (1932). On the Hayek-Sraffa debate see in particular 
Lachmann (1994a). 
24 See Faucci (1990), p. 206. 
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wishes to deeply criticize the marginalistic approach, suggesting to go back to 
the classical approach. In this path, Roncaglia (1990, p. 235) shows three steps: 
the critics to Marshall, the critic edition of Ricardo’s works and the publishing of 
Sraffa (1960). As well explained also in Lachmann (1994a), Sraffa (1932a) can be 
considered the start of a neo-ricardian revolution against the subjectivist 
approach; the young Italian only apparently is Keynesian; he uses Keynesian 
instruments, but he is fully Ricardian25.   
We cannot deep here the development of the Sraffa’s thought. It is interesting 
to read Roncaglia (1990), which identifies two economists that after the Second 
Wolrd War collect the Sraffa heritage in order to develop new approaches still 
strictly related with Sraffa. We can identify the Ricardian approach by Pasinetti26 
and the Smithian approach by Sylos Labini27. 
Pasinetti28 develops a growth model starting with Ricardo but including also 
the post-keynesian distribution theory (the distribution of wealth between 
salaries and profits is linked with the investments, through the consumption 
propensity and the growth rate). The other fundamental contribution is the 
theory of the vertically integrated industries. The Pasinetti purpose is to build up 
a new theory, connecting Keynes and Kalecki, Leontief and Sraffa, the Harrod-
Domar model29. 
Sylos-Labini, instead, which studied also with Schumpeter at Harvard, traces 
back his research development to Smith, but starting with the Schumpeter’s 
heritage on the different market typologies, stressing in particular the role of 
innovation and big corporations in an oligopolistic. His methodological 
approach comes from Smith, while his major works are the attempt to build a 
Keynesian framework on the market typologies. From Schumpeter he takes the 
role of innovations, but the general approach is the Keynesian macroeconomics 
à-la-Sraffa. Concerning business cycle theory, instead, he develops a model based 
on Schumpeter, Keynes and Marx30. 
 
 
IV 
THE LEONI’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECD 
 
 We have to be sincere since the beginning. The Leoni’s contribution to the 
SECD is not important in itself. As we will see, he stresses and repeats the Mises’ 
original contribution, published in 1920. However, as we already pointed out, the 
                                                 
25 On the neo-ricardian revolution see Lachmann (1973), chapter 3. 
26 Roncaglia (1990), pp. 248-251. 
27 Roncaglia (1990), pp. 255-258. 
28 On Sraffa’s and Pasinetti’s role in the ricardian revival see Lachmann (1973), chapter 3, section 
B.  
29 Roncaglia (2003), pp. 509-511. 
30 See Ferlito (2011a). 
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Leoni’s effort is really important considering the general hostile environment 
that we can find in Italy, at that moment, regarding the free-market approach. 
Bruno Leoni promotes the debate through Il Politico, a liberal journal, still 
published nowadays, in which even Hayek publishes around ten papers between 
1951 and 197031. In Il Politico Hayek signs a Leoni’s memory in 196832. For this 
journal Leoni writes several papers on the SECD and, more important thing, 
invites many prominent scholars to join the debate. It is useful to take a look to 
the contents of the journal issues regarding the topic. 
 
Il Politico, Quaderno No. 1: La ricomparsa della pianificazione economica in occidente33, 1963. 
- Bruno Leoni, La ricomparsa delle teorie della pianificazione economica in occidente, p. 5; The revival 
of «Economic Planning» in the West, p. 7. 
- A.A. Shenfield, La pianificazione economica in Gran Bretagna: pretese e realtà, p. 9. 
- Leon Derwa, Planisme et liberté économique, p. 26. 
- Agustin Navarro Vazquez, La recente rinascita della pianificazione economica in alcuni paesi 
occidentali, p. 47. 
- Walter Stervander, A Note on Structural Planning in Sweden, p. 61; La pianificazione strutturale in 
Svezia, p. 67. 
- Hans F. Sennholz, The Alliance for Progress, p. 74; L’Alleanza per il Progresso, p. 83. 
- Ralph Harris, Information and Plannign, p. 92; Informazioni e pianificazione, p. 96. 
- Lawrence Fertig, Economic Planning in Some Western Countries, p. 100; Pianificazione economica 
in alcuni paesi occidentali, p. 108. 
- Sergio Ricossa, Sulla recente ricomparsa della pianificazione in Italia, p. 117; On the Recent Revival 
of Economic Planning in Italy, p. 119. 
- James M. Buchanan, Sovranità nazionale, pianificazione nazionale e libertà economica, p. 121. 
- Paul Hatry, Some Remarks on the Latest Tendencies towards Economic Planning in Some Occidental 
Countries, p. 128; Qualche rilievo sulle più recenti tendenze alla pianificazione economica in alcuni 
paesi occidentali, p. 130. 
- Henry Hazlitt, «Planning» versus the Free Market, p. 132; «Pianificazione» contro il mercato libero, 
p. 139. 
 
Il Politico, XXX, 3: Problemi della pianificazione sovietica34, September 1965. 
- Bruno Leoni, Il problema del calcolo economico nell’economia di piano, p. 415. 
- Bruno Leoni, Il contributo del Pareto allo studio del problema del calcolo economico in una società di 
piano, p. 455. 
- Alec Nove, Les probèmes actuels de la planification soviétique, p. 461. 
- Alec Nove, La funzione dei prezzi nell’economia sovietica, p. 474. 
- Basile Kerblay, La planification en tant que facteur de l’industrialisation soviétique, p. 490. 
- Basile Kerblay, Les avancées, les reculs et les perspectives de l’agriculture soviétique, 505. 
- Agostino de Vita, I grandi aggregati dell’economia sovietica, p. 518. 
- Renato Roncaglia, Pianificazione sovietica e commercio estero, p. 548. 
- Gino Martinoli, Impressioni di un viaggio nell’Unione Sovietica, p. 566. 
- Feliks Gross, Beginnings of Major Patterns of Political Parties, p. 582. 
                                                 
31 A complete list of the Hayek’s writing with the Italian edition is in Ferlito (2009), where the list 
of Hayek’s contributions to Il Politico can be found too. 
32 Hayek (1968). Bruno Leoni dies in 1967, killed asking for the monthly rent to one of his tenants. 
33 The revival of «Economic Planning» in the West. 
34 Problems of the soviet plan. 
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- Justus M. van der Kroef, «The One» «the Two»: the Dialectical Rationale of the Sino-Soviet 
Dispute, p. 599; «L’Uno» e «i due»: la base logica dialettica della controversia cino-sovietica, p. 609. 
- Joseph S. Roucek, Communist China’s Shadow over South America, p. 620. 
- Umberto Melotti, Note sul concetto di rivoluzione, p. 631. 
 
Il Politico, Quaderno No. 2: Nuovi studi sulla pianificazione35, 1965. 
- Bruno Leoni, Il mito del piano, p. 5; The Myth of the «Plan», p. 9. 
- James M. Buchanan, Are Rational Economic Policies Feasible in Western Democratic Countries?, p. 
13; È possibile attuare delle politiche economiche razionali nei paesi democratici occidentali?, p. 21. 
- Walter Hamm, Recent Experience of Economic Planning in the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 31; 
Recenti esperienze di pianificazione economica nella Repubblica Federale Tedesca, p. 37. 
- Paul Hatry, La programmation économique en Belgique, p. 43. 
- Sergio Ricossa, Economic Planning in Italy since 1943, p. 53; La programmazione economica in 
Italia dal 1943, p. 57. 
- Jacques Van Offelen, Recent Experience of Economic Planning in Western Countries, p. 61; Recenti 
esperienze di pianificazione economica nei paesi occidentali, p. 67. 
- Daniel Villey, La planification en France, p. 73. 
- A. De Graff, Recent Experience of Central Economic Planning in the Netherlands, p. 83; Recenti 
esperienze di pianificazione economica centrale nei Paesi Bassi, p. 87. 
 
The list of scholars joining the debate promoted by Leoni is really amazing. 
We can find very important names like Buchanan, Nove, Sennholz, Hazlitt. As it 
is possible to argue reading the contributions titles, the claim for a debate comes 
mainly from the emerging situation in Eastern Europe, where the situation of the 
socialist economies is a reality. But we can find also some historical records about 
central planning experiments in Western countries. 
We don’t need to talk too much about Leoni (1963). It is just an introduction 
to a special issue (Quaderno) of Il Politico, titled The revival of «Economic Planning» 
in the West. The quaderno collects papers from a conference, held in Belgium on 
September 1962 organized by the Mont Pelerin Society, the famous liberal think-
tank founded in Swiss in 1947. As Leoni (1963, p. 451) states, the special issues 
can be divided into two parts; five papers (Derwa, Harris, Buchanan, Hatry and 
Hazlitt) talk about the theoretical problems concerned with economic planning; 
the others (Shenfield, Navarro, Stervander, Sennholz, Fertig, Ricossa) deal with 
practical examples of economic planning in some Western countries. It is 
interesting to note as Buchanan affirms that no national central plan is 
compatible with an international integration (in that years the European 
Economic Community is moving her first steps). Hazlitt, instead, stresses the link 
between plan and political constraint.  
In the Quaderno no. 2 too, the paper by Leoni is an introduction. All the 
papers are devoted to plan experiences in the Western countries, while 
Buchanan, again, faces theoretical terms of the matter. Leoni (1965c) is longer 
than Leoni (1963) and it can be considered as a brief summary of the evolution of 
                                                 
35 New studies on economic planning. 
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the SECD; in particular, Leoni wishes to criticize the widespread belief that central 
planning is better than free market. 
 
«Programming» or «planning» of a country’s economic process is today presented as a 
sort of scientific device which could make the same process more rational, more 
coordinate, better calculable and foreseen, by overcoming the deficiencies of the market 
economy. 
The country’s government should see to this «progress» or a committee of experts 
appointed by it who would be concerned, through their researches and suggestions and 
finally through the orders of the authority that appoints them, with eliminating or at least 
«correcting» the so-called «market-anarchy». 
Today no idea seems more popular, at any rate in certain environments of amateur 
economists and amateur political economists, and at the same time more mistaken. (Leoni, 
1965c, p. 9). 
 
 Then Leoni (1965c, pp. 9-10) stresses that Pareto and Barone recognize that 
the central planner has to face the same troubles of private entrepreneurs, «to 
produce the consumers goods on demand and to produce them at economic costs». 
According to Leoni, Pareto and Barone realize that the nature of the problem is 
not mathematical, but of experience; it means that economic calculation can be 
possible only through the free action on the market, doing mistakes, trying 
something, under the guidance from the price mechanism. But then the Italian 
author affirms that the intuition by Pareto and Barone is developed only later on 
by Brutzkus, Pierson, Mises and Max Weber. 
Leoni (1965c, p. 10) clarifies the central point coming from Mises and the 
others and that Pareto and Barone missed to clearly express: the central planner 
cannot follow the way to act of the entrepreneurs, because in a planned economy 
disappears the fundamental criterion of verification, the mean to transmit 
information, the price mechanism. This objection, according to Leoni (1965c, p. 
11), has to be applied to central planning at any grade, not only to full 
communist societies.  
Leoni, as Huerta de Soto (2010), emphasizes as the problem is not 
mathematical, but basically related to the creation and transmission of 
information, that can occur only when people are free to act. 
 
The problem of economic calculation is an ever-recurring problem of comparison 
between subjective judgements of value expressed at every moment, in a monetary 
economy, in the market prices, not with the purpose of establishing impossible 
measurements or equivalences between the various individual valuations, but only to 
express priorities among needs which each interested individual considers more urgent, in 
every single moment of his participation in the economic process. (Leoni, 1965c, p. 12). 
 
However, we have to stress a different accent in the Leoni’s analysis if 
compared with Mises and the detailed Huerta de Soto (2010). The traditional 
Mises (1935) stresses the importance of the price mechanism in the creation and 
transmission of information. Leoni’s perspective is not different, but the way to 
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express this follows a more accountancy language; we believe that this is due to 
the accountancy theoretical tradition in Italy, that is very strong due to great 
teachers like Fabio Besta.  
 
[A]lthough all that remains valid that Pareto and Barone, had established concerning 
the impossibility of determining the economic process by means of a priori calculations, 
the possibility does not thereby follow at all that the central planner provides for the 
production with the method of the private operators. 
The latter in fact can always carry out their experiences in market-regime availing 
themselves of the criterion of verification, simple and classical, which consists in 
comparing costs and proceeds both expressed in market prices. (Leoni, 1965c, p. 10). 
 
As we will see also discussing about Leoni (1965a), the Italian scholar refers to 
the comparison between costs and proceeds in order to have a verification 
criterion. This is only apparently in contrast with Mises’ terminology. In fact, 
Leoni states immediately that this criterion is possible because the terms of the 
problem are expressed in market prices. Thus, the centre of the problem comes 
again to be the possibility that only in the market market prices can arise, in 
order to generate that information that Leoni calls costs and proceeds. 
As this problem cannot be solved with a-prioristic methods, without the free 
interaction in the market, the central planner has only 
 
two possibilities: to try and foresee without any objectively valid method the needs of 
all the individuals and the most adequate manner of satisfying them, or to renounce to any 
non arbitrary attempt whatever of foreseeing and satisfying those needs, and to proceed at 
random disregarding the valuations of the individuals. (Leoni, 1965c, p. 12). 
 
 We can consider Leoni (1963) and Leoni (1965c) important mainly because 
they introduce the debate in the special issues of Il Politico. A deep analysis can 
be found, however, in Leoni (1965a), while Leoni (1965b) analyzes the Pareto’s 
contribution to the debate36. 
 Leoni seems to be convinced that Barone solves the problem implied by the 
SECD. He states that Mises simply deepens the analysis, while Barone already 
solves the problem. His way to be misguided is opposite to the Schumpeter’s 
one. If the Austrian economist is convinced that Barone demonstrates that 
economic calculation in a socialist society is possible, the Italian affirms exactly 
the contrary. Huerta de Soto (2010) clarifies the matter. Schumpeter was wrong 
and misguided. Barone’s statements are a little bit confused, but for sure he is 
sceptical about the possibility to solve a mathematical problem. What he misses 
to clarify and to stress heavily is what instead Mises does: the mathematical 
problem not only cannot be solved, but cannot be formulated too, because in a 
planned economy the price mechanism, generating the information eventually 
                                                 
36 A collection of writings by Leoni on SECD and economic plan can be found in Leoni (2007, 
2009). 
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needed for such equation system, is not working at all, replaced by arbitrary 
thoughts of the planners. 
 What about Pareto? Leoni devotes to his contribution to the SECD a short 
paper37. As for Barone, Leoni (1965b) sees in Pareto a precursor of Mises’ 
analysis. In fact, Pareto’s works on the topic are published between 1896 and 
1902. Again, Leoni (1965b, pp. 454-455) states as for Pareto the problem for the 
central planner is the same like for the private entrepreneur, to use his own 
resources in the better way. But for solving this problem Pareto stresses that are 
necessary the costs, arising only from the market process. Till now, Pareto states, 
no socialist thinker was able to replace the market mechanism with another one. 
 In fact, only in the market costs can be determined because only in the market 
the prices can emerge38. Without prices any economic calculation is not 
conceivable, and prices don’t exist outside from the market. The central planner 
can only invent counting stratagems39. And Pareto also criticizes deeply the 
possibility to determine the prices through the production costs40. 
 Leoni (1965b, p. 458) recalls how Pareto states that economics can do no 
predictions and without predictions any plan is useless. What is different 
between Pareto and Mises, according to Leoni (1965b, p. 459), is the aim of the 
analysis. If Mises was looking for a demonstration that economic calculation is 
not possible in a planned economy, Pareto wishes to build a general and “pure” 
theory, valid for all the kind of economic systems. 
 The longest contribution of Leoni to the SECD is Leoni (1965a). In this paper 
we can find his clear view on the matter, starting with a definition: «The problem 
of the economic calculation can be defined in general as the problem to assess, 
which is the relationship between costs and proceeds of the satisfaction process in 
the economic choices»41.  
Thus, an action has to be defined as useful if proceeds overcome costs. The 
author explains that economies of any type, either centralized of free, have to 
solve this fundamental problem: the economic calculation intended as a mean to 
measure either the success or the failure of a certain economic concern.  
 Leoni stresses that the economic calculation problem has not to be confused 
with the problem to produce a costi economici, that’s to produce in an effective 
way: 
 
 il primo problema ha infatti natura propriamente contabile, mentre la soluzione del 
secondo implica l’impiego di attività e capacità d’ordine imprenditoriale, tecnico e 
                                                 
37 See Leoni (1965b). 
38 Leoni (1965b), p. 456. 
39 Leoni (1965b), p. 456. 
40 Leoni (1965b), p. 457. 
41 Leoni (1965a), p. 415. The paper is in Italian, any English translation comes from us. 
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organizzativo, senza le quali la produzione non può avere successo42. (Leoni, 1965a, p. 
418). 
 
 Following this distinction, Leoni (1965a, p. 418) distinguishes between Pareto 
and Barone (more concerned with the problem to produce in an effective way) 
on one side, and Mises and Weber (which study the pure problem of the 
economic calculation) on the other one. The two problems are related, but they 
cannot be confused.  
 The simple conclusion of Leoni, following Mises, is that only in a free market 
economy a solution can be brought out, because in the free market economy the 
information is exchanged between the actors through the prices. And the prices 
are the only valid mean to compare costs and proceeds. In a planned economy, in 
the absence of a market, the problem becomes technical, as economic choices are 
replaced by technical problems. 
 In the central part of the paper, Leoni analyses the historical setting of the 
debate, devoting a lot of pages to Mises, the critiques against him and the replied 
from Mises again. But in his conclusion, the Italian author again stresses that no 
technical solutions can be found to solve the problem, the nature of which is 
strictly economic, referring to the human action. So, the only possible approach is 
the one coming from Mises, centred on the human interaction as generator of 
market prices as only way to rationally discover the success of an entrepreneurial 
choice. 
 We finally have to refer to Leoni (1972), the book that made Leoni famous all 
over the world. Even if it is not an economics book, in it we can find some notes 
on the SECD. His considerations on the matter are not the central focus of the 
volume, but they are really deep and we can consider them more important that 
what we can find later in the papers we talked about until now. In fact, in 
Freedom and Law the theoretical impossibility of economic central plan is 
considered only a part in a more general problem, regarding the possible action 
of the legislator. 
 
 [T]his demonstration [that a centralized economy does not work] may be deemed the 
most important and lasting contribution made by the economists to the cause of individual 
freedom in our time. However, its conclusion may be considered only a as a special case of a more 
general realization that no legislator would be able to establish by himself, without some kind of 
continuous collaboration on the part of all the people concerned, the rules governing the actual 
behavior of everybody in the endless relationships that each has with everybody else. No public 
opinion polls, no referenda, no consultations would really put the legislators in a position 
to determine these rules […]. The actual behavior of people is continuously adapting itself 
to changing conditions. (Leoni, 1972, pp. 18-19).  
 
                                                 
42 We could translate this passage as follows: «the first problem, in fact, has a pure accounting 
nature, while the solution of the second one implies the use of entrepreneurial, technical and 
organizational activities and skills; without them, production cannot be successful». 
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The argument is stressed later on with a critique to the free-market 
economists, accused to don’t realize the connection. Leoni states that the idea of 
certainty of the law is not compatible with the free market. 
 
The fact that the central authorities in a totalitarian economy lack any knowledge of 
market prices in making their economic plans is only a corollary of the fact that central 
authorities always lack a sufficient knowledge of the infinite number of elements and 
factors that contribute to the social intercourse of individuals at any time and at any level. 
The authorities can never be certain that what they do is actually what people would like 
them to do, just as people can never be certain that what they want to do will not be 
interfered with by the authorities if the latter are to direct the whole law-making process of 
the country. 
Even those economists who have most brilliantly defended the free market against the 
interference of the authorities have usually neglected the parallel consideration that no free 
market is really compatible with a law-making process centralized by the authorities. This 
leads some of these economists to accept an idea of the certainty of the law, that is, of 
precisely worded rules such as those of written law, which is compatible neither with that 
of a free market nor, in the last analysis, with that of freedom understood as the absence of 
constraint exercised by other people, including the authorities, over the private life and 
business of each individual. (Leoni, 1972, p. 90). 
 
In this intuition, that the problem of the economic calculation is only a part of 
a biggest problem regarding the theoretical conflict between certain of law and 
rule of law, we can find the major Leoni’s contribution to the debate. And we 
cannot find it in his specific papers on the matter, but in his major work, Freedom 
and Law, still nowadays a milestone in the liberal thought. 
 
 
V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 What we wished to show with the present paper is that the debate about the 
possibility of a rational economic calculation in a socialist society has not to be 
considered concluded with the papers of the great economists during the first 
part of the last century. Pareto, Barone, Mises, Hayek, Keynes, Lange, are just the 
most famous names involved in the debate.  
 The disputes goes ahead and finds a great advocate for the free market in 
Bruno Leoni, the Italian scholar more active in promoting the liberal thought in 
Italy after World War II. His contribution is not important under a general 
theoretical perspective. In fact, mainly he repeats what already stated by Mises 
and Hayek, rediscovering the importance of Pareto and Barone. 
 However, he promotes, through Il Politico, a deep debate during the Sixties, 
the years in which Italy is becoming, as many other Western countries, a socialist 
and central planned State. His voice is quite isolated in a general scenario in 
which the government intervention seems to be the only effective way to control 
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economic problems43. Not only the Italian government is shifting toward a 
centre-left coalition (Fanfani), but also the economic debate is dominated by two 
brilliant Sraffian economists, Luigi Pasinetti and Paolo Sylos Labini, while Sraffa 
himself publishes in 1960 is main book. 
 Then, with Leoni (1972), the Italian scholar will give is more important note 
on the debate: to put the economic calculation problem into a wider frame. The 
planning action is not only to be referred to the economic context, but to the 
more general realm of the legislative action. The certainty of law is not 
compatible with a true free market society. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Regarding this problem it is a “must” to read what Hayek wrote referring to the relationship 
between economic intervention, inflation and full employment. Hayek argues how the politics 
that link inflation and full emplyoment simply misdirect the labour market, creating persisting 
disturbances and, in the medium and long run, generating a more deep unemployment. See 
Hayek (1950, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c).  
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